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I.

OPENING KICKOFF - INTRODUCTION

“We’re consumers. We are by-products of a lifestyle
obsession. Murder, crime, poverty, these things don’t
1
concern me.”

1.

FIGHT CLUB (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1999).
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Recently, all it took to play in the National Football League
(NFL) was superior athletic ability and prowess, as NFL
management was reluctant to discipline NFL players involved in
2
criminal acts and other problems off the field. As late as the
1990s, “murder” was the only criminal offense said to bar an athlete
3
from playing in the NFL. This reluctance to discipline players
allowed the NFL to continue to feed the public’s obsession with
football by showcasing the best physically skilled players on the
4
Feeding this obsession eventually led to the NFL’s
field.
emergence as the richest and most profitable sports league in the
5
world.
In today’s information age, however, a player’s off-field
6
misconduct is under the microscope. The off-field misconduct is
subject to increasing scrutiny partly because of the news media’s
blasting of the latest scandals and partly because of the nature of
7
the offenses. Lately, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell’s docket
contains a wide assortment of matters, including Michael Vick’s
8
involvement in illegal dogfighting, an assistant coach arrested for
9
allegedly driving naked through a fast-food pickup window, and
2. Cf. Ellen E. Dabbs, Intentional Fouls: Athletes and Violence Against Women, 31
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 167, 176 (1998) (discussing the rare instances in which
commissioners used their powers to discipline players involved in sexual assault or
domestic violence).
3. JEFF BENEDICT & DON YAEGER, PROS AND CONS: THE CRIMINALS WHO PLAY IN
THE NFL 40 (1998) (“[T]he authors asked player agent Leigh Steinberg if there
were any criminal offenses that would altogether bar a player from playing in the
NFL. ‘Murder,’ he replied . . . .”).
4. Cf. id. at 5 (suggesting that NFL teams will forgive habitual criminal
offenders if they can run forty yards in less than 4.3 seconds).
5. In 2006, the NFL’s mean operating income was $17.8 million out of $204
million in revenue. Kurt Badenhausen, Michael K. Ozanian & Christina Settimi,
The Business of Football, FORBES.com, Sept. 13, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/
business/2007/09/13/nfl-team-valuations-biz-07nfl_cz_kb_mo_cs_0913nfl_land.
html.
6. See Sean Bukowski, Flag on the Play: 25 to Life for the Offense of Murder, 3
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 106, 108 (2001) (noting that athletes are high-profile
public figures, in which every aspect of their lives draws media attention).
7. See Stuart Elliott, Mending a Bruised Image, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2007, at C1
(explaining that news coverage of professional football reads more like a police
blotter).
8. See Michael S. Schmidt & Judy Battista, After Plea, Vick Is Barred Indefinitely
by the N.F.L., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2007, at D1 (reporting that Atlanta Falcons’ star
quarterback, Michael Vick, agreed to plead guilty to felony charges stemming
from placing dogfighting bets and helping to kill underperforming dogs).
9. See Sports Briefing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2007, at D7 (reporting that on
August 24, 2007, police stopped Joe Cullen, assistant coach of the Detroit Lions,
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the New England Patriots videotaping their opponent’s signals
10
during games.
Goodell’s ability to discipline this wide-range of incidents
derives from two categories of conduct listed in the NFL’s
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA): “conduct on the playing
field . . . [and] conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public
11
confidence in, the game of professional football . . . .” Moreover,
to handle players’ off-the-field misconduct specifically, the NFL
decided to implement a conduct policy in 2000, making it the first
12
among major sports.
Since that time, conduct policies are
13
becoming more popular among individual teams in the NFL, as
14
well as collegiate athletic departments.
This article supports the NFL’s current enforcement of its
conduct policy, and explains its emergence in four parts. First, this
note details the NFL’s conduct policy and disciplinary action in the
15
NFL.
Second, it provides a historical evolution of sports
16
commissioners’ broad disciplinary powers. Third, it explains why
Roger Goodell’s current enforcement of the NFL’s conduct policy

and cited him on suspicion of indecent and obscene conduct. The police said he
was driving nude. In a separate incident one week later, Cullen was arrested for
drunken driving).
10. See Richard Sandomir, Goodell Defends Punishment and Warns of Other
Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2007, at D2 (reporting that on September 9, 2007
the New England Patriots used a video camera in violation of league rules to spy
on the New York Jets’ defensive signals).
11. NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASS’N, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NFL MANAGEMENT COUNCIL AND THE NFL PLAYERS
ASSOCIATION, art. XI, § 1, para. a, at 20 (2006), available at http://www.nflplayers.
com/user/template.aspx?fmid=181&lmid=231&pid=0&type=l [hereinafter NFLCBA].
12. See Plus: Pro Football – Owners Meeting; Changes Approved on Player Conduct,
N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2000, at D7 (stating that the NFL renamed the Violent Crime
Policy the Personal Conduct Policy).
13. In 2005, the Minnesota Vikings implemented a seventy-seven page
conduct policy following the Minnetonka Boat Cruise Incident, which resulted in
four players being charged with lewd conduct. Mark Maske & Les Carpenter,
Player Arrests Put the NFL in a Defensive Mode: High Number Alarms League as it Works to
Protect Its Image, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2006, at A1.
14. Florida State University’s Athletic Department used its code of conduct to
suspend Geno Hayes and Joe Surratt indefinitely following their arrests for an
altercation with the Tallahassee Police Department on September 21, 2007.
Andrew Carter, Bowden Holds Off on Hayes, Surratt, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 25,
2007, at D8.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
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is legal, just, and the best for the business.
Finally, the note
includes recommendations for the NFL to improve its conduct
policy before concluding on the current state of athletes’ conduct
18
in major sports.
II. FIRST DOWN – HANDLING MISCHIEF IN THE NFL
A. Disciplinary Action
The NFL Commissioner may discipline players, coaches, and
19
other employees for misconduct taking place on and off the field.
On-the-field misconduct usually includes players being
20
unnecessarily violent or celebrating excessively during games.
Off-the-field misconduct usually includes players using banned
21
substances, gambling, or engaging in criminal activity.
In
response, the commissioner may punish players using any number
22
of various NFL documents in his disciplinary arsenal. Currently,
NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell’s weapon of choice in fighting
off-the-field misconduct is the league’s conduct policy.
B. NFL’s Conduct Policy
The NFL and the National Football League Players Association
(NFLPA) did not collectively bargain for the conduct policy during
labor negotiations. Moreover, the conduct policy is not part of the
league’s constitution and bylaws. This does not mean, however,
that the league unilaterally imposed the conduct policy without any
23
input from the NFLPA. Nevertheless, the NFL’s conduct policy is
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part V.
19. NFL-CBA, supra note 11, art. XI, § 1, para. (a), at 20.
20. “Unnecessary roughness” is a personal foul and “excessive celebrations”
are unsportsmanlike conduct; both infractions are fifteen-yard penalties enforced
against the offending team. 2006 Official Playing Rules of the National Football
League, http://blogmedia.thenewstribune.com/media/2006%20NFL%20RULE
BOOK.pdf.
21. See Jan Stiglitz, Player Discipline in Team Sports, 5 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 167, 177
(1995) (discussing that integrity-related discipline includes issues like gambling,
drugs, and other off-the-field conduct).
22. The league constitution, uniform player contract, and the collective
bargaining agreement are all governing documents granting the commissioner
disciplinary authority over off-the-field conduct.
23. See Ken Murray, Goodell Gets Tough: Commissioner Looks to Shore Up NFL’s
Tarnished Image, Cracks Down on ‘Pacman’ Jones, Henry for Repeated Arrests, BALT. SUN,
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24

one of the league’s rules and regulations.
Specifically, the
conduct policy states in part:
Engaging in violent and/or criminal activity is
unacceptable and constitutes conduct detrimental to the
integrity of and public confidence in the National
Football League. Such conduct alienates the fans on
whom the success of the League depends and has negative
and sometimes tragic consequences for both the victim
and the perpetrator. The League is committed to
promoting and encouraging lawful conduct and to
providing a safe and professional workplace for its
25
employees.
1.

Categorizing Misconduct

The conduct policy categorizes three types of conduct subject
to discipline: prohibited conduct, persons charged with criminal
26
First,
activity, and persons convicted of criminal activity.
27
prohibited conduct entails “covered persons” engaging in (or
aiding, abetting or conspiring to engage in or to incite) “violent
28
and/or criminal activity.” The policy also includes a non-exclusive
29
list of examples constituting “violent and/or criminal activity.”

Apr. 11, 2007, at 1E (quoting NFLPA executive director Gene Upshaw, “[w]e
believe that these are steps that the commissioner needs to take and we support
the policy.”); see also David Elfin, On Top of His Game: Goodell’s First Nine Months on
Job Have Been Busy, WASH. TIMES, June 20, 2007, at C1 (discussing that Goodell
established a six-player advisory council, in which he receives direct input from the
players on various issues. One player on the panel said, “[e]veryone who was in
that initial meeting pretty much anticipated what he was going to do about the offthe-field problems that we have been having.”).
24. Other league rules and regulations include agent regulations, banned
substances, and financial advisor regulations. NFL Rules and Regulations, available
at http://www.nflplayers.com/user/template.aspx?fmid=181&lmid=232&pid=0&
type=l.
25. NFL Conduct Policy, available at http://www.nflplayers.com/user/
template.aspx?fmid=181&lmid=336&pid=0&type=n.
26. Id.
27. See id. (stating that NFL players under contract are not the only ones
considered “covered persons” under the policy). “Covered persons” also includes
full-time employees of the NFL or its member teams, rookie players once selected
in the NFL College Draft, and all other prospective employees once they
commence negotiations for employment. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. The policy states:
[A]ny crime involving the use or threat of physical violence to a person
or persons; the use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime;
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Moreover, the league prohibits using “words or conduct
suggest[ing] that criminal conduct is acceptable or condoned
30
within the NFL.”
Second, persons simply charged with criminal activity are
subject to disciplinary action and mandatory clinical evaluations
31
and counseling. Third, the commissioner may fine or suspend a
32
Additionally, multiple
person convicted of criminal activity.
convictions or violations of the policy result in an automatic
suspension or banishment determined at the discretion of the
33
commissioner.
The league acknowledges that its players and
coaches are public role models and states that the NFL is
34
“committed to promoting and encouraging lawful conduct.” By
stating this, the league is rationalizing that off-the-field misconduct
35
affects the integrity and popularity of the league.
2.

Procedure

First, the commissioner must discover prohibited conduct.
Under the NFL’s policy, the duty of reporting prohibited conduct
36
The violator must report any arrests or
rests on the violator.
37
charges of prohibited conduct to their clubs or NFL Security. In
today’s information age, however, access to news around the clock
can make reporting an unnecessary procedure. Nevertheless, it is
the commissioner’s duty to investigate any reports of prohibited
conduct and ultimately decide whether to impose disciplinary
38
action.
In cases where conduct goes unreported, the

possession or distribution of a weapon in violation of state or federal law;
involvement in “hate crimes” or crimes of domestic violence; theft,
larceny or other property crimes; sex offenses; racketeering; money
laundering; obstruction of justice; resisting arrest; fraud; and violent or
threatening conduct.
Id.
30. Id. (alteration in original).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See generally NFL-CBA, supra note 11, art. XI (describing the
commissioner’s disciplinary authority).
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commissioner may investigate possible prohibited conduct on his
39
own initiative.
3.

Disciplinary Action

Under the conduct policy, the commissioner has discretion to
40
fine, suspend, or banish players. Upon reaching a decision, the
commissioner notifies the player of any disciplinary action through
a written letter; the NFL also sends a copy of the letter to the
41
NFLPA. The player disciplined then has the right to appeal the
42
commissioner’s decision within twenty days. The appeal to the
commissioner is the offender’s only right to appeal in the NFL,
unlike other major sports which allow appeals to a neutral third
43
party.
a.

April 10, 2007

On April 10, 2007, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell decided
44
to strengthen the league’s conduct policy.
Goodell did not
drastically change the policy language, but he put everyone on
45
notice regarding how he would enforce it. Goodell warned that
he would discipline violators with longer suspensions and larger
46
fines. He also stated that he would hold those employed at the
club and league levels accountable under the new policy by
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

NFL Conduct Policy, supra note 25.
Id.
Id. See also infra Parts IV.A.4.a.
Id.
Id.
See Mike Reiss, Jones Takes Hit from NFL: Titan Suspended for 2007 Season,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 11, 2007, at 5D (recapping Goodell’s press conference
regarding the strengthening of the NFL’s conduct policy).
45. Compare NFL Conduct Policy, supra note 25 (showing that the only major
language change in the policy occurs under the subdivision Persons Charged with
Criminal Activity, which requires those arrested for or charged with prohibited
conduct to undergo, “an immediate, mandatory clinical evaluation and, if
directed, appropriate counseling. Such evaluation and counseling must be
performed under the direction and supervision of the NFL Vice President of
Player and Employee Development.”) and NFL Personal Conduct Policy (Mar. 13,
2007), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2798214 (showing that the
language of the policy prior to April 10, 2007 required “a consultation and
additional counseling as directed” for persons arrested for or charged with
prohibited conduct). Therefore, the policy’s only major substantive change is the
immediacy of a mandatory clinical evaluation and its supervision by a superior
league official for those persons violating prohibited conduct.
46. See Reiss, supra note 44 (noting that Goodell promised harsher penalties).
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subjecting teams to discipline for club employee violations.
Goodell immediately backed up his words with significant action.
On April 10, 2007, Roger Goodell handed down some of the
48
harshest suspensions for off-the-field misconduct in NFL history.
Goodell suspended Tennessee Titans’ cornerback Adam “Pacman”
Jones for the entire 2007 season and suspended Cincinnati
49
Bengals’ receiver Chris Henry for eight games.
Technically,
Goodell suspended Jones and Henry for their numerous
50
encounters with law enforcement prior to April 10, 2007.
47. See Michael O’Keefe, Pacman Packs it in for Year: Jones Can Return, Victim
Never Will, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 11, 2007, at 57 (explaining that a team’s
punishment could include a loss of draft choices).
48. See Jarrett Bell, NFL Comes Down Hard on Jones, Henry: Titan Suspended for
Season, Bengal for Eight Games, U.S.A. TODAY, Apr. 11, 2007, at 1C (discussing the
commissioner’s suspension of Jones and Henry as two of the harshest suspensions
in NFL history for off-the-field conduct).
49. Id.
50. Greg Garber, Pacman Jones Incidents (Apr. 10, 2007), http://sports.espn.
go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2790090. Jones’ nine separate incidents since being
drafted in April 2005:
• 07/13/05: Jones is arrested by Nashville police at Titans headquarters and
charged with assault and felony vandalism stemming from a nightclub
altercation.
• 09/05/05: Jones has a loud verbal tantrum when told to wait in line for his
car and he did not pay for valet service while attending the annual Nashville
Sports Council Kickoff Luncheon.
• 10/25/05: State of West Virginia alleges that Jones violated the terms of his
probation; a judge extends his probation ninety days.
• 02/06/06: “Jones is arrested in Fayetteville, Ga., and charged with
possession of marijuana. He is handcuffed after throwing a punch at an
officer . . . and charged with a felony count of obstruction and two
misdemeanors of obstructing police.” The court dropped the possession of
marijuana charge in January 2007; the court still has not set a trial date for
the obstruction charge.
• 03/23/06: “A Fayette County drug task force SWAT team serves a search
warrant at the Georgia home Jones bought for his mother. . . . Jones admits
to police he has been smoking and that it will be several weeks before he is
able to pass a drug test.”
• 04/18/06: “According to Nashville police, who cite surveillance camera
footage, Jones is one of 12 people gathered at a gas station when a fight
breaks out and gunshots are fired.”
• 08/25/06: “Jones is arrested in Murfreesboro, Tenn., for disorderly conduct
and public intoxication. At the Sweetwater Saloon, he is accused of assault
by Toya Garth, who says Jones spit in her face and she spit back.”
• 10/26/06: “Jones is cited for misdemeanor assault at Club Mystic, a
Nashville nightclub, where he allegedly spits in the face of a female college
student. He is suspended for one game by the Titans . . . .”
• 02/19/07: “Jones is present when an early morning brawl breaks out at
Minxx Gentlemen’s Club in Las Vegas. Three people are shot. Club co-
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Goodell’s new strict enforcement laid the groundwork for handling
the Michael Vick situation later in 2007.
b.

Michael Vick

On July 17, 2007, the news media was abuzz as a federal grand
jury indicted Atlanta Falcons quarterback and All-Pro, Michael
51
Vick. The grand jury charged Vick with sponsoring a dogfighting
52
Six days later, Roger
operation named “Bad Newz Kennels.”
Goodell instructed Vick to stay away from the Falcons training
53
camp until the league reviewed the charges.
The league also
asked the Atlanta Falcons, as a club, to refrain from taking action
54
against Vick until the league completed its investigation.
55
Although the Falcons had the right to discipline Vick, the league’s
56
disciplinary action supersedes any individual club’s action.
On July 26, 2007, Vick pleaded not guilty to the dogfighting
57
charges. At the time, the commissioner faced two basic concerns
that arise when employers discipline employees.
First, the

owner Robert Susnar claims the shooter—still at large—acted on Jones’
behalf. Jones denies this.”
Id. Jones currently faces two felony charges of coercion from this incident.
Michael O’Keeffe, Pacman Backed Into a Corner: Faces Felony Charges in Vegas Shooting,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 21, 2007, at 68. See also James Alder, James’ Football Blog:
The
Chris
Henry
Weekly
Rap
Sheet
(June
15,
2006),
http://football.about.com/b/a/257717.htm (describing the nature of Henry’s
four arrests in a fourteen month span: (1) alleged possession of marijuana; (2)
waived a gun at a crowd of people; (3) drove under the influence; and (4)
provided alcohol to three females under the age of eighteen).
51. Indictment, United States v. Michael Vick et al., Criminal No. 3:07CR
(E.D. Va. July 17, 2007), available at http://assets.espn.go.com/media/pdf/070
717/vick_indictment.pdf.
52. See Michael S. Schmidt, In the Case Against Vick, Dogs Are Held as Evidence,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2007, at D1 (discussing that prosecutors used the fifty-four pit
bulls recovered by law enforcement to indict Vick on felony charges).
53. See Clifton Brown & Judy Battista, Vick Goes to Court as Falcons Go to Camp,
N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2007, at D1 (describing the commissioner ordering Vick to stay
away from camp and the Falcons adjusting to life without Vick).
54. See Judy Battista, Team Owner Says Falcons Planned to Suspend Vick, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2007, at D2 (explaining Atlanta Falcons’ owner Arthur Blank’s
decision-making process on whether to suspend Vick).
55. See NFL-CBA, supra note 11, art. VIII, § 1, para. a, at 11 (noting that the
club may discipline a player for conduct detrimental to the club).
56. Id. at art. XI, § 5, at 20.
57. Judy Battista, Without Contact, Vick Takes Hit in the Pocket, N.Y. TIMES, July
28, 2007, at D1.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss3/4

10

Ambrose: The NFL Makes It Rain: Through Strict Enforcement of Its Conduct
3. AMBROSE - ADC

2008]

4/23/2008 1:20:23 PM

THE NFL MAKES IT RAIN

1079
58

commissioner had to afford Vick due process. This did not mean
Goodell had to wait for the legal system to adjudicate Vick, but it
did mean Goodell had to grant Vick due process by providing a
59
meaningful notice and hearing. Second, Goodell had to avoid
60
Completely ignoring
prejudicing the legal action against Vick.
these two concerns can lead the commissioner into the court room
61
as a defending party.
On August 23, 2007, less than one month after Vick pled not
guilty, Vick reconsidered and signed a plea agreement admitting
62
his involvement in the dogfighting operation. The next day, after
the government filed Vick’s plea, Goodell suspended Vick
63
indefinitely. According to league policy, Goodell notified Vick
64
and the NFLPA of the suspension through the required letter. In
the letter, Goodell explained that Vick violated the league’s
65
conduct policy and his player’s contract. Goodell noted that he
would review Vick’s status following the conclusion of his legal
66
proceedings, and offered Vick the right to appeal. In the NFL’s
disciplinary system, the commissioner plays the roles of prosecutor,
67
judge, and jury. This unusual amalgamation of power is owed to

58. See Matthew B. Pachman, Note, Limits on the Discretionary Powers of
Professional Sports Commissioners: A Historical and Legal Analysis of Issues Raised by the
Pete Rose Controversy, 76 VA. L. REV. 1409, 1430–32 (1990) (discussing due process
constraints on commissioner actions).
59. See id. at 1432 (“Where notice and a hearing are not supplied, courts will
be quick to condemn commissioner actions.”).
60. See Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F. Supp. 924, 928–29 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (issuing a
temporary restraining order against the commissioner’s investigations and hearing
into Rose’s alleged gambling because Commissioner Giamatti prejudged Rose’s
case).
61. Id.
62. See Elliot, supra note 7, at C1 (noting that Michael Vick pleaded guilty to a
felony charge of conspiracy deriving from illegal dog fighting); see also Plea
Agreement, United States v. Michael Vick, Criminal No. 3:07CR274 (E.D. Va. Aug.
24, 2007), available at http://assets.espn.go.com/media/pdf/070824/vickplea.pdf.
63. Michael S. Schmidt & Judy Battista, After Plea, Vick is Barred Indefinitely by
the N.F.L., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2007, at D1. See also Letter from Roger Goodell,
Comm’r, Nat’l Football League, to Michael Vick (Aug. 24, 2007) [hereinafter
Goodell Letter], available at http://assets.espn.go.com/media/pdf/070824/
michaelvickletter.pdf.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Bukowski, supra note 6, at 113 (noting that an NFL commissioner can
act as the “judge, jury, and executioner.”).
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Major League Baseball, which shaped the broad commissioner
68
authority seen in professional sports today.
III. SECOND AND LONG – EVOLUTION OF COMMISSIONERS’ BROAD
POWERS
A. MLB Shapes Commissioner Authority
69

Baseball created the office of the commissioner in 1921, and
its eventual success with the position ultimately led other major
70
sports to follow suit and create their own commissioners. But,
baseball is the sport primarily responsible for shaping today’s
commissioners’ powers, partly due to various legal battles testing
71
the scope of the commissioners’ authority.
1.

Kenesaw Mountain Landis, 1921 – 1944

“In the early days of baseball, open gambling was as common
as a well-executed sacrifice bunt. Gamblers filled the stands and
72
bet on everything, including individual at bats.”
This type of
73
behavior, including the infamous Black Sox Scandal and the case
74
American League Baseball Club of New York v. Johnson, gave baseball’s
68. See Pachman, supra note 58, at 1413 (noting that “baseball, of all the
sports, is the best vehicle to examine the genesis of the commissioner’s office.”).
69. See id. at 1413 n.19 (stating that Landis was appointed the first
commissioner of major league baseball in 1921).
70. See id. at 1417 n.55 (stating that the NFL changed its president’s title to
commissioner in 1941, and the NBA named Maurice Podoloff its first
commissioner in 1949); see also Jason M. Pollack, Note, Take My Arbitrator, Please:
Commissioner “Best Interests” Disciplinary Authority in Professional Sports, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1645, 1647 n.14 (1999) (explaining that the National Hockey League did not
name its first commissioner, Gary Bettman, until 1992).
71. Pachman, supra note 58, at 1420–27.
72. Wayne S. Quirk, Baseball’s Big Inning: The Sacrifice of the 1919 Black Sox, in
SPORTS AND THE LAW, MAJOR LEGAL CASES 111, 113 (Charles E. Quirk ed., 1996).
73. See Pachman, supra note 58, at 1413–14 & n.20, (citing ELIOT ASINOF,
EIGHT MEN OUT 39–121 (Henry Holt & Co. 1963) (1987) (explaining the Black
Sox scandal, which involved eight Chicago White Sox players who were accused of
accepting gamblers’ money to “throw” the 1919 World Series)).
74. 179 N.Y.S. 498 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1919). In 1919, Boston Red Sox pitcher Carl
Mays unknowingly tested the powers of the Major League Baseball’s commission
when he walked off the field in the middle of a game. Id. at 499–500. This
resulted in the Boston Red Sox selling Mays to the New York Yankees and the
major league baseball commission subsequently suspending Mays for deserting his
team. Id. at 501. American League Baseball Club of New York v. Johnson immediately
ensued and the court held that the league could only discipline a player for his
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image a black eye and prompted Baseball to create the
75
commissioner position. Baseball wanted the commissioner to be a
separate entity from the league with the authoritative ability to
76
clean up the game. United States District Court Judge Kenesaw
Mountain Landis fit the bill, and baseball named him its first
77
commissioner in 1921.
Judge Landis accepted the position only after the league
agreed to grant him broad powers to discipline players based upon
78
the “best interests” of the game. Landis did not waste any time
79
During his twenty-four year
wielding his new-found powers.
80
tenure, Landis banned thirteen players from the game for life,
including the eight players involved in the Black Sox scandal, even
though a conciliatory grand jury cleared the players of any
81
wrongdoing.
Landis even butted heads with Babe Ruth when Ruth violated
82
the prohibition of “barnstorming.” Landis did not back down to
83
baseball’s biggest superstar and suspended Ruth for the first six
84
weeks of the 1922 season. Landis’ suspensions were all within his
authority because the league’s agreement granted him the broad
power to “impose punishment and pursue legal remedies for any

playing of the game on the field. Id. at 504–05.
75. Pachman, supra note 58, at 1413–14.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1414.
78. See Shayna M. Sigman, The Jurisprudence of Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis,
15 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 277, 303–04 (2005) (describing Landis’ negotiations with
major league baseball for the commissioner’s position).
79. See infra notes 80–88 and accompanying text.
80. See Pachman, supra note 58, at 1415 (“[for] violations ranging from
gambling to the suggestion by a pitcher that he would leave his club so that it
would not win the pennant.”) (alteration in original).
81. Sigman, supra note 78, at 305.
82. See Pachman, supra note 58, at 1415–16 (“Barnstorming involves [players]
playing exhibition games in small towns that do not have their own teams.
Barnstorming was frowned upon by major league owners who feared that their
best players might be hurt playing in such games.” (quoting P. DICKSON, DICKSON
BASEBALL DICTIONARY 30–31 (1989))).
83. Babe Ruth’s hall of fame career included 714 homeruns, a lifetime
batting average of .342, ninety-four wins as a pitcher, including seventeen shutouts, and a member of seven World Series championship teams. These statistics
are available at http://www.baberuth.com/flash/about/stats.html.
84. See Sigman, supra note 78, at 310–12 (detailing Landis’ battle with Babe
Ruth).
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conduct of league personnel that he determined to be detrimental
85
to the best interests of the game.”
86
In 1931, Milwaukee American Association v. Landis provided the
87
first and only legal test to Landis’ broad authority. The court held
that Landis acted within his authority and specifically stated, “the
commissioner is empowered to investigate upon his own initiative
any act, transaction, or practice charged or alleged to be
88
detrimental to the best interests of baseball.” This single legal test
of Landis’ authority may have been indicative of the general
89
attitude toward authority at that time.
2.

Bowie Kuhn, 1969 – 1984
90

Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Bowie Kuhn provided another
opportunity for the legal system to define the scope of the
91
commissioner’s authority, forty-five years after Landis. In 1976,
92
Oakland Athletics’ flamboyant owner Charles O. Finley sparked a
court battle when he sold three of his star players before the trade
93
deadline.
Baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn rejected the
transactions, causing Finley to immediately bring suit. Once again,
a commissioner acting in the “best interests” of the game reigned

85.
86.
87.

Pachman, supra note 58, at 1415.
49 F.2d 298 (N.D.Ill. 1931).
See PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW, TEXT, CASES,
PROBLEMS 14 (3d ed., Thomson West 2004) (1993) (explaining that American
Association v. Landis arose out of Landis’ refusal to approve a St. Louis Browns’
transaction involving, “a player named Fred Bennett [who] had been transferred
several times between the St. Louis Browns and several minor league teams, but all
the clubs were secretly controlled by Browns’ owner Phil Ball.”).
88. Landis, 49 F.2d at 302.
89. “Former Baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn has pointed out that, at the
time Landis served as commissioner, people tended to accept quietly the acts of
those in leadership positions, but that after World War II ended, baseball owners
became increasingly willing to challenge commissioner authority.” Pachman,
supra note 58, at 1416.
90. 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978).
91. Landis, 49 F.2d 298.
92. See C.W. Nevius, Flamboyant Ex-A’s Owner Finley Dies, His Teams Won Three
Straight World Series, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 20, 1996, at A1 (describing Finley’s
flamboyancies, including being responsible for changing Oakland’s uniform
colors to “kelly green, wedding gown white and California gold.”).
93. Finley, 569 F.2d at 531. Finley sold stars Joe Rudi and Rollie Fingers to the
Boston Red Sox for $2 million and Vida Blue to the New York Yankees for $1.5
million. Commissioner Kuhn disapproved of the assignments stating they were
“inconsistent with the best interests of baseball, the integrity of the game and the
maintenance of public confidence in it.” Id.
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supreme as the court held that “the Commissioner acted in good
faith, after investigation, consultation and deliberation, in a
manner which he determined to be in the best interests of
94
baseball.”
3.

Ted Turner & The Atlanta Braves

Also in 1976, the Atlanta Braves and its owner Ted Turner
found themselves testing the commissioner’s authority in the
courtroom. Commissioner Kuhn suspended Turner for one year
for commenting on a potential free agent in violation of league
95
rules. Furthermore, Kuhn took away the Braves’ first round draft
96
choice in the upcoming amateur draft. The Atlanta Braves and
Ted Turner immediately filed a complaint against the
commissioner seeking to enjoin Kuhn from imposing the
97
sanctions.
Once again, the court upheld a commissioner’s authority and
held that, “the defendant Commissioner had ample authority to
punish plaintiffs in this case, for acts considered not in the best
98
interests of baseball.” The court, however, limited the scope of
the commissioner’s authority and decided that taking away the
99
Braves’ draft pick was excessive.
4.

Pete Rose

In 1989, Pete Rose, manager of the Cincinnati Reds, gambled
on his own team to win and found himself subject to the
94. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 87, at 23 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
95. See id. at 25 (describing that in September of 1976, Kuhn discovered that
the Atlanta Braves’ General Manager violated Major League Rule 3(g), which
prohibited tampering when he made improper contact with potential free agent
Gary Matthews. Kuhn fined the Braves $5,000 and took away their first pick in the
amateur draft. Then in October 1976, Atlanta Braves’ owner Ted Turner told San
Francisco Giants’ owner Bob Lurie that “the Braves would go as high as necessary
to get Matthews” thus violating the tampering rule again).
96. Id.
97. Atlanta Nat’l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213 (D.
Ga. 1977).
98. Id. at 1220.
99. See id. at 1226 (“The deprivation of a draft choice was first and foremost a
punitive sanction, and a sanction that is not specifically enumerated . . .
[a]ccordingly, the court concludes that the Commissioner was without the
authority to impose that sanction, and its imposition is therefore void.”)
(alteration in original).
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100

commissioner’s discipline. When Commissioner Giamatti caught
wind of the rumors involving Rose’s gambling habits, he hired John
101
Dowd, a Washington lawyer, to investigate the rumors.
Once
Rose learned of Giamatti’s investigation, he filed suit in state court
102
Jurisdictional disputes
to enjoin the commissioner’s actions.
followed and Giamatti eventually removed the case to federal
103
court.
Ultimately, the case settled out of court and resulted in
104
Rose’s ban from baseball. Although the case settled, “the judicial
opinion in Rose v. Giamatti . . . laid bare the reality . . . that Major
League Baseball is a unique organization . . . [with] extraordinary
105
power invested in the Commissioner.”
B. History of the NFL Commissioner
The Associated Press donned Jim Thorpe as the greatest
106
Thorpe’s
athlete in the first half of the twentieth century.
stardom led the American Professional Football Association
(renamed the NFL in 1922) to name him its first president in
107
1920. Joe Carr became president after Thorpe’s lone year in the
108
Carl Stock
position, and he served as president until 1939.
followed Carr as president until 1941 when the NFL formally
109
changed the title of its “president’s” position to “commissioner”
110
Layden served as the
and appointed Elmer Layden to that post.

100. See PETE ROSE & RICK HILL, MY PRISON WITHOUT BARS 147–48 (2004)
(describing why he lied about gambling on his own team to win).
101. Id. at 149.
102. Id. at 166.
103. Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F. Supp. 906, 908 (D. Ohio 1989).
104. See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 87, at 9 (“Rose agreed on August 23,
1989 to settle the case on the terms that Rose would withdraw his suit, accept the
Commissioner’s jurisdiction and penalty, but neither admit nor deny having bet
on baseball.”).
105. Id. (citing Rose v. Giamatti at 917) (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
106. See Hal Bock, 100 Years That Transformed Sports, SEATTLE TIMES, May 30,
1999, at D1 (“[Thorpe was named] the world's greatest athlete [by the Associated
Press, because] . . . he won the pentathlon and decathlon in the 1912 Olympics,
played professional baseball and football for 20 years and was commissioner of the
football league that became the NFL.”).
107. MICHAEL MACCAMBRIDGE, AMERICA’S GAME: THE EPIC STORY OF HOW PRO
FOOTBALL CAPTURED A NATION 7 (2004).
108. See id. at 7–9 (detailing Joe Carr’s years as NFL president).
109. See Pachman, supra note 58, at 1417 n.55 (noting that the NFL changed
the title of “president” to “commissioner” in 1941).
110. MACCAMBRIDGE, supra note 107, at 9.
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NFL’s commissioner for five years, followed by Bert Bell who took
111
No notable
over the office in 1946 until his death in 1959.
suspensions for off-the-field misconduct took place, however, until
NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle investigated player gambling in
1963.
1.

Pete Rozelle, 1960 – 1989

In 1963, NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle butted heads with
the Green Bay Packers’ Hall of Fame running back Paul
112
113
In 1962,
Hornung and Detroit Lions All-Pro Alex Karras.
rumors of gambling by NFL players prompted Rozelle to appoint
114
NFL Treasurer Austin Gunsell to investigate the matter.
As a
result of the investigation, Rozelle suspended Hornung and Karras
115
Rozelle reinstated
indefinitely for gambling on football games.
both players after one year, allowing Hornung to play a significant
116
role on the Packers’ NFL championship team in 1965.
Even without today’s broad commissioner powers at his
disposal, Rozelle received a great deal of praise for handling the
117
Sports Illustrated
league’s gambling crisis in the early 1960s.
even named Rozelle “Sportsman of the Year” in 1963, “[f]or his
118
actions in preserving the integrity of the NFL.”
Notably, Rozelle’s ability to land television contracts paved the
119
In 1962, Rozelle
way for the NFL’s future financial success.
negotiated the first league-wide television contract with CBS worth
$4.65 million, substantially increasing the league’s revenue111. See id. at 40 (detailing the NFL owners’ selection of Bell as commissioner).
See also id. at 124–26 (detailing Bell’s last days as commissioner before he died of a
massive heart attack while watching the Philadelphia Eagles play the Pittsburgh
Steelers at Franklin Field in Philadelphia).
112. See SPORTS AND THE LAW, MAJOR LEGAL CASES, supra note 72, at 85–86
(noting that Hornung was an All-American twice, won the Heisman trophy in
college, and was an All-Pro for the Green Bay Packers in 1960 and 1961).
113. See id. at 86 (noting that Karras was also an All-American twice in college
and an All-Pro for the Detroit Lions in 1960 and 1962).
114. Id.
115. See id. (“[Hornung] reportedly placed bets ranging from $100 to $500 on
football games dating back to 1958. From 1959 to 1961, Karras made bets from
$50 to $100 on NFL games.”).
116. Id. at 87.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 86.
119. See FORBES.com, supra note 5 (noting that the NFL is now the richest and
most profitable sports league in the world due in part to its multi-billion dollar
television contracts).
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120

generating power. Rozelle’s financial accomplishments gave him
more leverage at the bargaining table with owners and in 1988
prompted the league to grant him as commissioner “‘full,
complete, and final jurisdiction and authority [over] any dispute
121
involving a member or members in the League.’” One year later
Rozelle would step down as commissioner, allowing a trial lawyer to
fill his shoes.
2.

Paul Tagliabue, 1989 – 2006

Paul Tagliabue is one of many commissioners in sports to carry
122
a legal background into office.
Prior to holding the
commissioner’s office, Tagliabue represented the NFL as outside
123
counsel in various capacities.
Specifically, Tagliabue defended
124
the NFL in an antitrust case brought by the USFL in 1988.
Although the NFL technically lost the case, the USFL walked away
125
with a mere $3.00 in damages. Tagliabue’s years of legal training
could be one of the reasons why he created a policy regulating
conduct in the NFL.
Originally, the name “conduct policy” sprang from the NFL’s
126
At the time, football
“violent crime policy” adopted in 1997.
players were being increasingly associated with crimes of domestic
127
violence.
This problematic behavior prompted Tagliabue to
120. MACCAMBRIDGE, supra note 107, at 173.
121. Pollack, supra note 70, at 1677 (citing NFL CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS §
8.3, at 17–18 (1988)).
122. Current NBA Commissioner David Stern and current NHL Commissioner
Gary Bettman are both attorneys. See NBA.com, David J. Stern,
http://www.nba.com/nba101/david_j_stern_bio.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2008);
Cornell University—Alumni Profile, http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/alumni/profiles/
alumni/Gary-Bettman.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2008) (stating that Bettman
received his undergraduate degree from Cornell and his law degree from New
York University).
123. See MACCAMBRIDGE, supra note 107, at 381 (noting that Tagliabue
represented the NFL in over fifty cases prior to becoming commissioner).
124. U.S. Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 842 F.2d 1335 (1988).
125. Id. at 1341.
126. See John Gibeaut, When Pros Turn Cons: Athletes Who Commit Crimes are
Giving Sports a Black Eye. But While the NFL Claims It’s Tackling the Problem, Other
Leagues Appear Content to Sit on the Sidelines, 86 A.B.A.J. 38, 108 (July 2000) (“The
violent crime policy came in 1997, amid criticism in some quarters that the NFL
had become a league full of criminals.”).
127. See Anna L. Jefferson, The NFL and Domestic Violence: The Commissioner’s
Power to Punish Domestic Abusers, 7 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 353, 353 (1997) (“Fifty-six
current and former football players and eighty-five college players were reported
to the police for violent behavior toward women between January 1989 and
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adopt the policy before the start of the 1997 season, making it the
128
only one of its kind among major U.S. sports. The violent crime
policy allowed the commissioner to suspend and/or fine a player
charged with any crime of violence, and required the offender to
129
undergo counseling and clinical evaluations.
Notably, Tagliabue fined Baltimore Ravens’ star linebacker Ray
Lewis $250,000 after Lewis pled guilty to a misdemeanor crime of
130
Tagliabue disciplined
obstructing law enforcement in 2001.
Lewis to protect the league’s image by stating that, “such admitted
misconduct clearly contributes to the negative stereotyping of NFL
131
Although some viewed Lewis’ punishment as weak, at
players.”
the time it was the largest fine ever in the NFL unaccompanied by a
132
suspension.
C. NFL Present Day
1.

Roger Goodell, August 2006 – Present

In August 2006, the thirty-two NFL owners unanimously
133
elected Roger Goodell as the league’s new commissioner.
Goodell’s NFL service dates back to 1982, when he was an intern in
134
the NFL’s offices in New York. After a short stint in the New York
Jets public relations office in 1983, Goodell returned to the
league’s office and continued to climb the NFL’s corporate

November 1994.”).
128. See Randy Covitz, NFL Puts Offenders on Notice: Off-Field Transgressions Won’t
Be Tolerated by League with New Policy in Effect, KAN. CITY STAR, July 2, 1998, at D1
(noting that the NFL’s violent crime policy is the first among major sports to
discipline off-the-field transgressions).
129. See Bukowski, supra note 6, at 110 (citing NFL VIOLENT CRIME POLICY, 1998
ROOKIE SYMPOSIUM-TAB 7: LEAGUE POLICIES FOR PLAYERS (1998)).
130. See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 87, at 99 (describing Lewis’ obstruction
of law enforcement’s investigation involving two stabbing deaths outside an
Atlanta nightclub shortly after the 2001 Super Bowl).
131. Id.
132. See Brian Lewis, Rejuvenated Jumbo Will Only Miss One, N.Y. POST, Aug. 25,
2000, at 100 (discussing that Ray Lewis received the largest ever non-suspension
fine in the NFL history).
133. George Vecsey, Sports of the Times; Bridging the Old N.F.L. With the New, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2006, at D1.
134. See Judy Battista, Pro Football; Lifetime Spent Preparing for Top Job in the N.F.L.,
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2006, at 81 (describing Goodell’s career background in the
NFL).
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135

ladder. In 2000, Goodell became Commissioner Paul Tagliabue’s
right hand man, assuming the positions of NFL Chief Operating
136
Officer and Executive Vice President.
Therefore, when Goodell
took the reins of the commissioner’s office in 2006, he was no
stranger to the inner workings of the NFL’s $6 billion a year
137
The protection of the NFL’s wealth and image quickly
industry.
became one of Goodell’s top priorities, especially since player off138
the-field misconduct plagued his first year as commissioner.
2.

Miscreants in the NFL

During Goodell’s first years as commissioner, nine players on
the Cincinnati Bengals were arrested during a nine month span,
139
and ten players were arrested in a fourteen month span. Notably,
Bengals’ linebacker Odell Thurman served a season-long
suspension in 2006 based on an arrest for drunken driving and
140
subsequently missing a scheduled drug test.
Thurman applied
141
for reinstatement after one year pursuant to the league’s policy.
Goodell, however, denied Thurman’s reinstatement for the 2007
142
season.
As a result, Thurman will miss two seasons of play and
salary due to off-the-field misconduct.
Cincinnati’s players were not the only ones getting in trouble
143
with Goodell during his first year. On June 5, 2007, Goodell used
the conduct policy again and suspended Chicago Bears’ defensive
tackle Terry “Tank” Johnson for the first eight games of the 2007
144
NFL season.
Goodell suspended Johnson because in December
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. See David Flores, Ex-Cowboy has Key Job with Team, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESSNEWS, Aug. 9, 2007, at 1C (“Goodell has made addressing players’ bad off-field
behavior one of his top priorities since succeeding Paul Tagliabue a year ago.”).
139. See Joe Kay, NFL Teams on Notice: Character Counts, CHARLESTON GAZETTE
(W. Va.), Apr. 26, 2007, at 5B (discussing the Cincinnati Bengals’ problems with
players’ off-the-field run-ins with law enforcement).
140. See Alex Marvez, Assessing the New NFL Commissioner’s Job Performance, S. FLA.
SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 2, 2006 (discussing Thurman’s drunken driving arrest and
violations under the NFL’s drug policy).
141. See NFL Suspends Bengals CB Joseph for One Game, PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV.,
Oct. 10, 2007 (noting that Thurman sat out the 2006 season for violating the
NFL’s substance abuse policy and that Goodell denied Thurman’s reinstatement
the next year).
142. Id.
143. See Flores, supra note 138.
144. Clifton Brown, The Bears’ Tank Johnson is Suspended for Eight Games, N.Y.
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2006, he violated his probation when the Gurnee Police
Department raided his home and found six unregistered firearms,
145
including two assault rifles.
As a result of the raid, Tank pled
146
guilty to a misdemeanor weapons charge in May 2007 and served
147
jail time for the offense and for his probation violation.
In Tank’s situation, Goodell waited to suspend Tank until the
legal system decided its course of action. But according to the
league’s policies, the commissioner can discipline a player without
148
waiting for the legal system to determine a player’s fate.
More
importantly, the commissioner need only afford players due
149
The
process during the commissioner’s investigation.
commissioner may not, however, immediately suspend a player
without some sort of “investigation, consultation, and
150
deliberation.”
IV. THIRD DOWN CONVERSION – ROGER GOODELL’S RULINGS ARE
LEGAL, JUST, AND THE BEST FOR THE BUSINESS
A. Legal
Principles in labor law and private association law protect
Goodell’s decisions to discipline players and coaches for off-thefield misconduct. Labor law allows sports leagues to collectively
bargain with employee unions to reach agreements that govern
151
As a result, players are able to negotiate
terms of employment.
with teams for multi-million dollar contracts in exchange for
following league’s rules, such as off-the-field conduct.
1.

Labor Law

Historically, employees in large numbers had difficulty
TIMES, June 5, 2007, at D6.
145. NBC 5 Sports, Tank Johnson Charged After Police Raid Home, Dec. 14, 2006,
available at http://www.nbc5.com/sports/10535933/detail.html (noting that
children were also in Johnson’s home and some of the guns were loaded during
the raid).
146. Brown, supra note 144.
147. Id.
148. NFL Conduct Policy, supra note 25.
149. Pachman, supra note 58, at 1430–32.
150. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 87, at 23.
151. See 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS § 11:10 (Gary A.
Uberstine ed., 2003) (explaining collective bargaining in sports).
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negotiating for better working conditions with management.
The emergence of labor law helped protect workers’ rights by
153
governing the relationship between employers and employees.
Athletes in major sports, however, did not start to receive better
154
wages and conditions until the emergence of unions. Under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), unions received the
exclusive right to negotiate working conditions on behalf of
155
employees.
Importantly, the NLRA grants employers and the employee’s
156
exclusive bargaining agent the right to enter into CBAs. Once an
agreement is finalized, it supremely governs the terms and
157
conditions of employment.
Moreover, once the parties reach an
agreement, labor law “precludes . . . employer[s] from changing
those terms and conditions without engaging in collective
158
bargaining . . . .” Without these agreements, employers would be
able to impose mandatory terms and conditions of employment
159
As a result, these agreements check and balance
unilaterally.
sports commissioners by not allowing them to change certain rules
160
and regulations without player input.
Additionally, in most
circumstances private association law allows voluntary associations

152. See JAMES B. JACOBS, MOBSTERS, UNIONS, AND FEDS: THE MAFIA AND
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 5 (2006) (explaining that in the United States, labor
unions have been fighting for better wages and working conditions since the
eighteenth century).
153. See HAROLD W. DAVEY ET AL., CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 2–3
(4th ed. 1982) (explaining the collective bargaining process).
154. See generally id. at 28–30 (describing the emergence of unions).
155. See id. at 31–32 (explaining that the NLRA, formerly known as the Wagner
Act, grants labor unions the power to represent employees exclusively at the
bargaining table).
156. Id.
157. 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 151, § 11:10.
158. Id. (citations omitted).
159. See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 87, at 227 (noting that under the NLRA,
the mandatory subjects of collective bargaining are wages, hours, and working
conditions) (citing Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea
Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689–90 (1965)).
160. 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 151, § 11:10
(“[A]n arbitrator ruled that Rozelle could not unilaterally impose a new drug
program, which included the unscheduled drug testing of players, because that
too constituted a unilateral change in the terms and conditions of employment
that could only be effectuated through collective bargaining.” (citing Nat’l
Football League Players Ass’n & Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council & the Nat’l
Football League (Kasher, Arb.) (Oct. 25, 1986))).
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to handle their own disputes without the legal system’s
161
interference.
2.

Private Association Law

While labor law governs interactions between employers and
employees, private association law grants people the right to create
162
Once created,
associations, or the employers themselves.
associations have the right to form their own rules and
163
regulations.
Courts will typically not interfere with a private
association’s rules and regulations, including disciplinary actions,
as long as the association follows basic requirements of due process
164
and administrative standards.
Sports leagues enjoy the protections of private association law
when they create policies, such as a conduct provision, governing
165
employees.
However, the various court battles testing the scope
of the commissioners’ powers provide that private association law is
166
Therefore, leagues
not blanket immunity from the legal system.
attempt to avoid court battles and implement their own governing
documents defining responsibilities of the league, clubs, and
players.
3.

Governing NFL Documents
a.

League Constitution & Bylaws

A sports league’s constitution contains its fundamental laws
167
and principles.
This foundational document delegates certain
168
powers to the league and commissioner.
Sports leagues balance
the powers granted in the constitution with other governing league

161. See 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 151, § 11:11.
162. See generally 6 AM. JUR. 2D Associations and Clubs § 1 (1999) (describing the
general powers of associations).
163. See id. at § 6 (explaining associations’ rights to create bylaws, rules and
regulations).
164. Pachman, supra note 58, at 1430-32.
165. See 6 AM. JUR. 2D Associations and Clubs § 6 (1999).
166. See supra Part III.A.1–4. (detailing legal battles testing commissioners’
disciplinary authority); see also 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra
note 151, § 11:11 (explaining court cases testing disciplinary powers of
commissioners).
167. 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 151, § 11:6.
168. Id.
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169

documents.
The CBA is the most important league document
170
governing conditions of employment for the players.
b.

Collective Bargaining Agreement

During times of labor peace, a CBA governs the terms and
conditions of employment for players, league officials, and league
171
Strikes and lockouts mainly ensue because of the
employees.
172
parties’ inability to reach agreement on a new CBA or renew the
173
previous one.
Most CBAs in sports cover the same basic themes,
such as drafting of non-league players; standard player contracts;
free agency; minimum salaries; pensions; injury protections; drug
174
policies; control of agents; and discipline. After the parties reach
an agreement on the issues, they attempt to decide its term of
years. The parties come back to the bargaining table roughly two
to three years before the CBA expires to give them enough time to
175
reach agreement.
In 1958, NFL commissioner Bert Bell officially recognized the
176
NFLPA as a union.
Ten years passed, however, until the League
177
and the players finalized a collective bargaining agreement.
Initially, the pages of the NFL’s CBA were basic and only covered
issues such as, “minimum salaries, pensions, injury and other

169. Id. § 11:8.
170. See generally NFL-CBA, supra note 11.
171. See 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 151, § 11:4
(“When all goes well, there is the collective bargaining agreement, entered into
between the union and the league . . . .”).
172. See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 384 (S.D.N.Y.
2004), rev’d, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Representatives of each of the thirty-two
teams . . . comprise the National Football League Management Council
(“NFLMC”), the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the League. The
1,400-odd NFL players are exclusively represented by the National Football League
Players Association . . . .”).
173. See 1 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS § 4:9 (Gary A. Uberstine
ed., 2003) (noting that labor strife plagued the NFL in the 1970s and 1980s, with
players’ strikes in 1974, 1982, and 1987). These strikes were mainly due to the
League and players’ inability to reach agreement on caps on players’ salaries and
restrictions on free agency. Id. Overall, the players did not achieve the success
desired by striking. See also id. (“It is impossible to characterize the players as
winners, and one is tempted to declare the owners outright victors.”).
174. Id. § 4:12-20.
175. See, e.g., Elfin, supra note 23, at C1 (explaining that Roger Goodell will
take part in CBA extension discussions three years before the agreement expires).
176. 1 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 173, § 4:2.
177. Id.
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insurance protection, and other conventional wage and conditions
178
of employment issues.”
In the 1970s and 1980s, the CBAs attempted to broaden
players’ issues such as the draft, free agency through negotiation,
179
Importantly, the terms of these agreements are
and arbitration.
180
only valid for durations determined by the parties. While owners
and players were arguing over salaries and free agency well into the
early 1990s, lesser known regulations regarding discipline were
181
agreed to in the 1993 CBA.
The CBA is one of the various documents allowing the
commissioner to discipline players to protect the “league’s
182
image.” In 1993, the NFL’s CBA provided the foundation for the
183
In 1993, the NFLPA
league’s broad disciplinary authority today.
and the NFL reached agreement on two significant articles of
discipline: one governing individual club discipline and one
184
governing commissioner discipline.
Currently, the NFL’s disciplinary sections detail the league’s
and clubs’ available authority to control their players’ misconduct
185
The agreement details
through suspensions and/or fines.
discipline for two types of behavior: conduct on the playing field,
and “conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence
186
in, the game of professional football.”
Furthermore, when
players sign their contracts, they agree to the commissioner’s
187
authority to discipline for conduct detrimental to the league.
c.

Uniform Player Contract

The standard NFL player contract is a basic framework of
minimum rights and conditions, which gives players and clubs a
188
Sometimes
foundation to build upon and create contracts.

178. Id. § 4:3.
179. Id.
180. Id. § 4:10.
181. See 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 151, § 11:24.
182. See NFL-CBA, supra note 11, at art. XI (allowing the commissioner to
discipline “for conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the
game of professional football . . . .”).
183. 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 151, § 11:24.
184. Id.
185. See Stiglitz, supra note 21, at 168–69 & n.4.
186. NFL-CBA, supra note 11, art. XI, § 1, para. (a), at 20.
187. NFL-CBA, supra note 11, app. C, para. 15, at 166.
188. See 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 151, § 11:5.
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player contracts include unusual clauses such as Oakland A’s owner
189
Charlie Finley offering players $300 if they grow a mustache,
Manny Ramirez’s no-trade clause taking effect only after another
190
Red Sox player received one, and the Roger Clemens “family
191
These supplementary contract clauses may not conflict
clause.”
192
with the minimum rights set forth in the CBA.
Significantly, each NFL contract contains an “Integrity of the
193
Under this clause, the commissioner has the
Game” clause.
power to fine, suspend, or terminate a player’s contract for,
“conduct reasonably judged . . . to be detrimental to the League or
194
This clause also requires the player to
professional football.”
recognize “the detriment to the League and professional football
that would result from impairment of public confidence in the
honest and orderly conduct of NFL games or integrity and good
195
character of NFL players.” Therefore, when a player signs a NFL
contract, he is agreeing to the commissioner’s discretionary power
196
to discipline for conduct.
4.

Picking Up the Blitz – Is the NFL Too Strict?
a.

Major Leage Baseball (MLB) Compared

Baseball does not have a per se “conduct policy.” But, the
commissioner of baseball does have the authority to discipline
“conduct by Major League Clubs, owners, officers, employees or
players that is deemed by the Commissioner to not be in the ‘best
197
interests’ of Baseball.”
Players and the Major League Baseball
189. Ron Kroichick, The Quirks of Perks: Player Contracts Can Run Gamut, S.F.
CHRON., Apr. 29, 2003, at C1 (describing unusual player contract clauses).
190. Id.
191. See Ron Chimelis, All in the Family Clause, THE REPUBLICAN (Springfield,
Mass.), May 21, 2007, at C1 (discussing the family clause that allows Roger
Clemens to leave the team in between starts to visit his family).
192. 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 151, § 11:5.
193. NFL-CBA, supra note 11, app. C, para. 15, at 166.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See Goodell Letter, supra note 63, at 3 (noting that Vick violated the terms
of his player contract and that the commissioner is disciplining Vick pursuant to
the commissioner’s power granted under the CBA).
197. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL CLUBS, MAJOR LEAGUE CONSTITUTION, Art. II § 3
(2005), http://www.bizofbaseball.com/docs/MLConsititutionJune2005
Update.pdf. See also Stiglitz, supra note 21, at 180–81 (noting that baseball initially
intended the “best interests” catch-all provision to handle gambling problems in
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Players Association (MLBPA) also receive advance notice of any
198
league investigations into player conduct.
Furthermore, baseball mandates a “just cause” standard of
199
review for disciplinary actions.
The league “makes whole” those
players who are found to be improperly disciplined under their
200
grievance procedures.
Even with all these disciplinary tools in
place, baseball still finds it unnecessary to implement a conduct
policy. Perhaps it should, considering the sport’s problem with
201
players and coaches driving under the influence of alcohol.
On March 22, 2007, St. Louis Cardinals manager Tony La
Russa was arrested on a drunken driving charge after police found
him asleep at the wheel of his car while it was partially stopped in
202
an intersection.
A little over a month later, one of La Russa’s
players, Josh Hancock, died when his sport utility vehicle crashed
203
into the back of a tow truck.
Hancock’s blood alcohol content
204
was twice the legal limit at the time of the crash.
Regardless, neither baseball nor its teams suspend or fine
205
players or coaches for drunken driving arrests. Rather, baseball is
trying to catch-up to the NFL’s drug testing standards and falling
behind in regulating conduct. A weak stance on conduct is not a
problem solely isolated to baseball.

the sport and not other types of conduct).
198. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASS’N, 2007-11 BASIC AGREEMENT
BETWEEN MAJOR LEAGUE CLUBS AND THE MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS
ASSOCIATION, art. XII, § E, at 45 (2006), http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_
english.pdf [hereinafter MLB-CBA].
199. See id. art. XII, § A, at 42–43 (“[I]n Grievances regarding discipline, the
issue to be resolved shall be whether there has been just cause for the penalty
imposed.”).
200. See id. (defining “make whole” to include repaying any fines, paying lost
salary including interest, and adjusting player statistics for incentive based contract
clauses only).
201. See Bill Plaschke, Baseball is Ripe for a 12-Step Program, L.A. TIMES, May 13,
2007, at 1 (discussing baseball’s refusal to acknowledge its drinking problem and
take actions to curb it).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Chuck Finder, Baseball Should Dry Up, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 20,
2007, at C2 (noting that it was also found that Hancock was talking on his cell
phone at the time of the crash and the police found marijuana in his car).
205. Plaschke, supra note 201, at 1 (“Baseball struts around the national stage
fighting steroids, then slips into the shadowy wings to embrace alcohol.”).
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National Basketball Association (NBA) Compared

The NBA has seen its fair share of problems on and off the
206
court, including Latrell Sprewell choking his coach in 1997, Ron
Artest jumping in the stands to fight rowdy Detroit Pistons fans in
207
2004, and Stephen Jackson firing gun shots outside a strip club in
208
In response to Sprewell’s choking incident, the NBA
2006.
implemented a rule that if a player attacks his coach, then the
209
league will terminate the player’s contract.
The NBA has its own CBA provision handling player
210
Additionally, the NBA’s constitution and uniform
conduct.
player contract grants the commissioner power to suspend and/or
fine any player who makes statements detrimental to the “best
interests” of the league or is “guilty of conduct that does not
211
conform to standards of morality and fair play.”

206. See Gibeaut, supra note 126, at 106 (describing the incident at a Golden
State Warriors’ practice in 1997, in which Latrell Sprewell choked his head coach,
P.J. Carlesimo).
207. See Liz Robbins, N.B.A. Bars 4 After Brawl Involving Fans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
21, 2004, at 11 (describing the brawl between players and fans during a game
between the Indiana Pacers and Detroit Pistons in Auburn Hills, Michigan, in
which Ron Artest jumped into the stands to fight fans after a fan threw a cup of
liquid on Artest).
208. See Union Considers Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2007 at D6 (describing
Jackson’s guilty plea to a felony count of criminal recklessness for firing shots
outside a strip club).
209. See Mike Wise, PRO BASKETBALL: NOTEBOOK; Barkley Has Influence on
Next Generation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1999, at D8 (discussing the NBA’s rule on
player’s attacking their coaches).
210. See NAT’L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS’N, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT,
art. VI (1999), available at http://www.nbpa.com/downloads/CBA.pdf
[hereinafter NBA-CBA] (including sections pertaining to unlawful violence,
counseling for violent misconduct, firearms, league investigations, and mandatory
programs).
211. See NBA Player’s Association, CBA Exhibit: Excerpt from NBA
Constitution (Misconduct), Excerpt from NBA By-laws (Waivers), and Agent
Certification, http://www.nbpa.com/cba_exhibits/exhibitA-excerpt.php (last
visited Feb. 09, 2008). Article 35(d) states:
. . . (i) shall have made or caused to be made any statement having, or
that was designed to have, an effect prejudicial or detrimental to the best
interests of basketball or of the Association or of a Member, or (ii) shall
have been guilty of conduct that does not conform to standards of
morality or fair play, that does not comply at all times with all federal,
state, and local laws, or that is prejudicial or detrimental to the
Association.
Id.
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Similar to baseball’s CBA, the NBA’s agreement includes a
provision that provides a “just cause” standard of review for
212
grievances challenging discipline.
Finally, NBA players have the
right to appeal grievances to a grievance panel and even to an
impartial arbitrator if the grievance panel does not resolve the
213
matter.
Double jeopardy presents another interesting issue in the
grievance process. For example, the NBA attempted to suspend
Latrell Sprewell for an entire season for choking his head coach
214
during a practice in 1997.
Prior to the league suspending
215
The neutral
Sprewell, his team suspended him for ten games.
arbitrator used a “just cause” standard of review and determined
216
that the two suspensions constituted double jeopardy.
Accordingly, the neutral arbitrator overturned the NBA’s
217
suspension and reinstated Sprewell’s contract.
In an attempt to
avoid these circumstances in the future, the NBA implemented a
provision similar to the NFL’s provision, that a league’s action
218
supersedes any club action.
c.

National Hockey League (NHL)

The NHL’s policies regulating misconduct are similar to those
found in other sports leagues, including, Article 18 of the NHL’s
CBA detailing the commissioner’s authority to discipline for actions
219
occurring on and off the ice.
The NHL’s standard player
212. Compare NBA-CBA, supra note 211, art. XXXI, § 14(c) (“[T]he issue to be
resolved shall be whether there has been just cause for the penalty imposed.”) with
MLB-CBA, supra note 198, art. XII, § A, at 43 (“[I]n Grievances regarding
discipline, the issue to be resolved shall be whether there has been just cause for
the penalty imposed.”).
213. Stiglitz, supra note 21, at 185.
214. Bukowski, supra note 6, at 115; Gibeaut, supra note 126, at 106; Pollack,
supra note 70, at 1698.
215. Bukowski, supra note 6, at 115; Gibeaut, supra note 126, at 106; Pollack,
supra note 70, at 1698.
216. See Bukowski, supra note 6, at 115 (explaining the double jeopardy
dilemma under commissioner and club disciplinary action).
217. See Liz Robbins, Union and Pacers Set to Fight Suspensions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
23, 2004, at D1 (noting that the arbitrator reduced Sprewell’s suspension to sixtyeight games, but did not allow the club to terminate Sprewell’s contract).
218. Compare NFL-CBA, supra note 11, art. XI, § 5, at 20 (noting that league
action precludes or supersedes club action for the same act or conduct) with NBACBA, supra note 211, art. VI, § 6 (noting that league action precludes or
supersedes club action for the same act or conduct).
219. NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS’ ASS’N, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
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contract also requires players to acknowledge that they will refrain
from “conduct detrimental to the best interest of the Club, the
220
League or professional hockey generally.”
Furthermore, the NHL and BASEBALL have similar provisions
regulating league investigations into player conduct which require
notification of any investigation that may result in disciplinary
221
action to the player and the players’ union. The NHL also grants
the right to hold a hearing before any discipline takes place and
222
allows a player to introduce evidence in his defense.
It is rare to hear about NHL players’ misconduct off the ice.
Unlike baseball, however, the NHL recently took a stand against
drunken driving. In September 2006, former San Jose Sharks’
forward Mark Bell was arrested on suspicion of drunken driving
223
and felony hit and run charges. The NHL responded by placing
Bell in its substance abuse program, suspending him indefinitely,
and recently tacking on a fifteen game suspension at the beginning
224
of the 2007 season. The NHL’s players’ union said they are going
to fight the suspension, something the NFLPA rarely does when the
225
commissioner disciplines under the conduct policy.
d.

NFLPA Compared

In the 1960s, three of the four major sports recognized players
226
unions,
followed by the National Football League Players

BETWEEN NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE AND NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS’
ASSOCIATION, art. 18, at 95 (2005), http://www.nhl.com/cba/2005-CBA.pdf
[hereinafter NHL-CBA].
220. Id. Exhibit 1, para. 2, at 245.
221. Id. art. 18, § 18.4(a), at 96.
222. Id. art. 18, § 18.4(d), at 97 (“[T]he Commissioner or his designee will not
impose discipline without holding a hearing. . . . The NHLPA and the Player have
the right to present testimony, evidence and argument in the Player’s defense.”).
223. See Damien Cox, Leaf’s Bell Will Sit 15 Games; Perhaps Drunk Driving
Suspension a Sign of New Priorities for NHL, HAMILTON SPECTATOR (Canada), Sept. 13,
2007, at SP06 (describing the NHL’s response to Bell’s and other NHL players’
incidents with drunken driving).
224. Id.
225. See N.H.L. Suspends Bell 15 Games, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2007, at D5 (stating
that the NHL’s players’ union will fight Bell’s suspension).
226. See Brent D. Showalter, Comment, Steroid Testing Policies in Professional
Sports: Regulated by Congress or the Responsibility of the Leagues?, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L.J.
651, 654 (2007) (“The first union of players in professional sports was the National
Basketball Players Association, which formed in 1964 . . . the Major League
Baseball Players Association in 1965. Two years later, the National Hockey League
Players Association was formed . . . .”) (citations omitted).
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227

Association in 1970. Importantly, the early union leaders laid the
ground work for players’ rights seen today. Each leader came from
a different background and carried with him a different set of
fundamental principles.
Marvin Miller, for example, was a highly respected labor
228
economist who directed the MLBPA from 1966–1992. Due to his
background of fighting for laborers’ rights, Miller focused his
efforts on players’ individual rights and, therefore, increased
229
The
minimum salaries and established free agency in baseball.
average salary for a baseball player in 1967 was $19,000 and
230
increased to $2.57 million in 2003, which is roughly twice the
231
$1.25 million average salary NFL players received in 2003.
In the NFL, Ed Garvey headed the NFLPA from 1971 to
232
Garvey, a sharp-edged lawyer from Wisconsin, fought
1983.
233
primarily for players’ equal rights, including free agency.
Player
equality reflects the NFL’s current cap on players’ salaries and
234
mandatory drug testing for performance enhancing substances.
By contrast, the MLBPA’s individual rights focus does not cap its
players’ salaries and only recently implemented performance235
enhancing drug testing.
Players’ unions also fight on behalf of the players whenever a
236
club or league suspends, fines, or otherwise reprimands a player.
The NFLPA supported Adam “Pacman” Jones’ appeal of his season237
long suspension in May 2007, which Goodell rejected.
Jones
227. Id.
228. Major League Baseball Players Association: Miller Biography,
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/bios/miller.jsp (last visited Feb. 29, 2008).
229. Id.
230. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 87, at 349.
231. Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2004),
rev’d in part, vacated in part, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
232. NFLPA History, available at http://www.nflplayers.com/user/template.
aspx?fmid=182&lmid=239&pid=0&type=l.
233. Id. See also MACCAMBRIDGE, supra note 107, at 316–17 (describing the
NLPA’s fight against the Rozelle Rule in the early 1970s).
234. See Showalter, supra note 226, at 657 (noting that the NFL began drug
testing players in 1987).
235. See id. at 658 (noting that baseball did not begin drug testing players for
steroids until 2002).
236. See Lonnie Wheeler, Nothing Illegal in Cut for Conduct, CINCINNATI POST,
May 24, 2007, at C1 (noting that the NFLPA is the organization that will protect
players from termination).
237. See Authorities Haven’t Carried Out Vick Search Warrant, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PRESS (Minn.), May 30, 2007, at D3 (explaining the NFLPA’s support of Jones’
appeal).
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sought leniency once again when the NFLPA appealed his
suspension on December 14, 2007, one month after Goodell
238
denied Jones’ request for leniency.
Goodell rejected the
NFLPA’s argument that Jones’ punishment was too excessive and
239
planned to review Jones’ status at the conclusion of the season.
The lack of NFLPA’s effective assistance, however, does not
mean that it does not care about players’ rights. Rather, it means
the NFLPA is on board with the league’s conduct policy and the
240
commissioner’s enforcement of it. With the NFLPA on board, it
is easier for the commissioner to persuade players that disciplining
241
off-the-field misconduct is the right thing to do.
B. Roger Goodell’s Rulings are Just
“[P]ower at its best is love implementing the demands of
justice, and justice at its best is love correcting everything
242
that stands against love.”
Roger Goodell has dedicated his entire professional career to
243
the NFL; he wants to see the league succeed more than anyone.
By strictly enforcing the NFL’s conduct policy, Goodell is
recognizing the problems of the past and is setting precedent for
the future, because past discipline for player misconduct was non244
existent, or at best, far too lenient.
Even though Goodell is
stricter on players than his predecessors, he has yet to ban a player
245
for life, thus giving them another chance. Although Goodell has
yet to do so, he promises to reinstate those players that conduct
246
themselves properly during their suspensions.

238. See Pac-Man’s Appeal Rejected, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 21, 2007, at
D3 (noting the NFLPA’s request for leniency on Jones’ suspension).
239. Id.
240. Murray, supra note 23, at E1.
241. Elfin, supra note 23, at C1.
242. Martin Luther King Jr., 11th Convention of the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference: Where Do We Go from Here? (Aug. 16, 1967), available at
http://www.peaceworkmagazine.org/pwork/0412/041216.htm.
243. See supra Part III.C.1.
244. See infra Part IV.B.1.
245. See supra Part II.B.3.a.
246. See Mark Maske, NFL Suspends Players, Stiffens Conduct Policy, WASH. POST,
Apr. 11, 2007 (“I must emphasize to you that this is your last opportunity to salvage
your NFL career . . . I urge you to take full advantage of the resources available to
support you in that effort.”) (quoting Roger Goodell’s letter to Adam “Pacman”
Jones and Chris Henry).
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Past Discipline was Too Lenient

Lenient may be too kind an adjective for the NFL’s past
discipline; non-existent might fit better. Jeff Benedict and Don
Yaeger studied 509 NFL players for the 1996–97 season and found
that 109 of those players were formally charged with a serious
247
crime. Of the 109 charged, the league did not ban one from the
248
The list of criminal conduct by players is nearly endless,
game.
and the NFL and other sports leagues were previously reluctant to
249
take disciplinary action.
Currently, the NFL is attempting to direct a ship lost at sea by
taking a stand against off-the-field player misconduct. The NFL is
standing up to some of its most popular players involved in
misconduct, regardless of the revenue some players generate for
250
the league, based on basic moral principles.
Furthermore, the
league believes its stance on player misconduct will actually
accelerate revenues by showing its fan base that the NFL will not
251
Additionally, the commissioner is
tolerate certain behavior.
teaching current and prospective players, along with NFL fans,
something about second chances because he gives players the
opportunity to rehabilitate their character.
2.

Roger Goodell Gives Players Another Chance

Showing that he is no cold-blooded dictator handing down
draconian punishments, Roger Goodell gives misbehaving players
252
Goodell laid out
another chance to get back into the league.
conditions for Adam “Pacman” Jones’ and Chris Henry’s
253
reinstatement in suspension letters to both players.
These
conditions included such things as complying with any required
247. BENEDICT & YAEGER, supra note 3, at 5.
248. Id.
249. Elliot, supra note 7, at C1.
250. See Dave Hackenberg, Banishment, MERRIVILLE POST-TRIB. (Ind.), Aug. 22,
2007, at B2 (noting that the NFL is punishing players, such as Michael Vick, for
legal and moral misconduct).
251. Cf. Rick Morrissey, Goodell’s Guts Will Result in League’s Glory: NFL
Commissioner’s Crackdown Aims to Win Back Fed-Up Fans, CHI. TRIB., June 6, 2007, at 1
(discussing the idea that the NFL is a league that depends on its fans embracing
the players, and recent player off-the-field misconduct is eroding fans’ sentiments
towards players).
252. Maske, supra note 246.
253. ESPN.com, Goodell Suspends Pacman, Henry for Multiple Arrests, May 17,
2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2832015.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008

33

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 4
3. AMBROSE - ADC

1102

4/23/2008 1:20:23 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:3

counseling, education and treatment, and no more run-ins with law
254
Although using a broad term such as “run-ins” is
enforcement.
vague and all-encompassing, the term still provides players with
expectations regarding future conduct. If players want to play in
the NFL, they must abide by the rules. Terry “Tank” Johnson took
this to heart: after Goodell suspended Johnson, Johnson told
255
Goodell that he hoped to become NFL’s next “Man of the Year.”
The jury is out, however, on whether the commissioner will
give Michael Vick another chance to get back into the league. He
will likely wait for Vick to finish his twenty-three month prison
sentence, handed down on December 10, 2007, for his involvement
256
in illegal dogfighting.
The commissioner thus benefited from
Vick’s guilty plea because he did not have to determine Vick’s fate
in the NFL while a legal ruling on his guilt hung in the balance.
3.

Down-Field Blocking – Due Process and the Separation of League
and State

Why is a commissioner able to discipline a player for actions
pending legal adjudication? Where are players’ rights to due
process and an opportunity to be heard? First, it should be noted
that the NFL satisfies administrative requirements by providing
257
notice and a hearing to disciplined players. Second, one needs to
simply distinguish between a league’s rules and state laws. Legal
258
As
proceedings do not control the NFL’s disciplinary power.
Goodell stated in connection with the league’s tougher personal
conduct policy, “[w]e must protect the integrity of the NFL. The
highest standards of conduct must be met by everyone in the NFL
259
because it is a privilege to represent the NFL, not a right.”
Regardless of a legal proceeding, the CBA, league constitution,
standard player contract, and conduct policy all bind a player to

254. Id.
255. See Calvin Watkins, NFL to Review Tank Johnson’s Case Next Week: Cowboys DT
Hopes to Have Suspension Reduced to Six Games, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 8, 2007
(discussing Goodell’s conversation with Johnson).
256. Bill Rankin & D. Orlando Ledbetter, Vick’s Lies Boosted Prison Time,
ATLANTA J. & CONST. Dec. 11, 2007, at A1.
257. See supra Part II.B.3.b (noting that Goodell granted Vick due process by
providing a meaningful notice and hearing).
258. See infra Part IV.B.3.a.2 (discussing Goodell’s statements regarding legal
proceedings controlling the league’s discipline).
259. See Steve Serby, A ‘Pac’ of Lies – NFL Must Ban Titan for Life, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, June 19, 2007, at 72 (quoting Roger Goodell).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss3/4

34

Ambrose: The NFL Makes It Rain: Through Strict Enforcement of Its Conduct
3. AMBROSE - ADC

2008]

4/23/2008 1:20:23 PM

THE NFL MAKES IT RAIN

1103

260

the commissioner’s imposed discipline. When a player enters the
league and signs a contract, the player agrees to defer to the league
261
and clubs’ disciplinary powers.
Moreover, as Roger Goodell
explicitly stated when he suspended Michael Vick, the league does
not have to wait for the legal system to adjudicate a player to
262
suspend him.
a.

Why Wait for a Legal Ruling?
263

In 2003 and 2004, Kobe Bryant was on trial for sexual assault.
264
The league, however, did not suspend him during this time. The
league’s inaction allowed Bryant to fly back and forth from the
Colorado legal proceedings to practices and games in Los Angeles
265
and other NBA cities.
The NBA’s policy language is not dramatically different than
the NFL’s. Each league may suspend a player for actions
266
But, the key difference is how each
“detrimental to the league.”
league enforces its policies. Ultimately, the judge in Bryant’s case
dismissed the charges, and the NBA never disciplined Bryant for
267
the incident.
Therefore, why not afford a player an opportunity
to prove his innocence?
The NFL answers this question by inserting its own definitions
268
of right or wrong and not binding itself to legal determinations.
If a player settles a case out of court because they pay their accuser
off, is the player’s underlying conduct not “detrimental” to the
league? Also, if a jury can find a player guilty on a lesser standard
260. See supra Part IV.A.3.a–c.
261. See NFL-CBA, supra note 11 (stating that players agree to the
commissioner’s authority to discipline for conduct detrimental to league).
262. See Goodell Letter, supra note 63.
263. See Kirk Johnson, As Accuser Balks, Prosecutors Drop Bryant Rape Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2004, at A1 (discussing the sexual assault case against Kobe Bryant).
264. See Jack McCallum & L. Jon Wertheim, The Great Unknown: Ten Seasons into
a Certain Hall of Fame Career, Kobe Bryant Remains, to Teammates and Opponents,
Admirers and Haters, as Big a Mystery as Ever, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 17, 2006, at
46 (noting that NBA commissioner David Stern did not suspend Kobe Bryant for
being charged with sexual assault).
265. See Regional Scene, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Dec. 27, 2004, at 17C
(noting that Kobe traveled between Colorado for court hearings and made it back
in time to play games in Los Angeles).
266. See supra Parts IV.A.3, IV.A.4.a.2.
267. McCallum & Wertheim, supra note 264, at 46.
268. See Goodell Letter, supra note 63 (“Quite apart from whatever sentence is
ultimately imposed upon you by the federal court in Virginia, your conduct plainly
merits a significant sanction by the NFL.”).
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than beyond a reasonable doubt, does this mean the player did not
violate any league policies? The NFL is not going to defer its
rulings to the legal system and get involved in these unpredictable
situations. Rather, Goodell is making his own determination on
conduct, and at the same time abiding by league policies.
Goodell’s enforcement was strikingly similar to Judge Kenesaw
269
Mountain Landis’ rulings on player gambling in the early 1920s.
b.

Landis & Goodell: The Similarities

Landis and Goodell both took office charged with the task of
270
cleaning up player misconduct in their respective sports.
Significantly, Landis used “best interests” determinations to punish
271
player misconduct regardless of legal system determinations.
This is exactly how Goodell is currently enforcing the conduct
policy in the NFL.
Even as a former judge, Landis disregarded the fact that the
court found all eight players innocent in the Black Sox scandal. As
Landis stated:
Regardless of the verdict of the juries, no player that
throws a game, no player that entertains proposals or
promises to throw a game, no player that sits in a
conference with a bunch of crooked gamblers, where the
ways and means of throwing games are discussed, and
does not promptly tell his club about it, will ever play
272
professional baseball.
These comments by Landis were comparable to Roger
Goodell’s statements to Michael Vick regarding his pending
charges on dogfighting. Goodell stated, “While it is for the
criminal justice system to determine your guilt or innocence, it is
my responsibility as commissioner of the National Football League
to determine whether your conduct, even if not criminal,
nonetheless violated league policies, including the personal
273
conduct policy.”

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
1C.

See infra IV.B.3.a.2.
See supra Parts III.A.1, III.C.1.
Sigman, supra note 78, at 304.
Quirk, supra note 72, at 118.
Larry Weisman, Vick Told to Stay out of Camp, USA TODAY, July 24, 2007, at
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While Landis received praise for the way he handled baseball’s
274
gambling problems, it is too early to determine the long-term
effects of Goodell’s suspensions, as more suspensions are likely to
come in the future. Thus far, most critics applaud Goodell as
someone who is enforcing the conduct policy and finally standing
275
up against player misconduct off the field. Nevertheless, it is not
unprecedented for a suspended player to receive an acquittal in the
legal system, thus forcing the league to acknowledge they made a
276
mistake.
c.

Vanished Presumption of Innocence

“Innocence is a highly overrated commodity.”

277

Many people have preconceived notions that those standing
278
trial for criminal charges are ultimately guilty of the crime. This
societal notion could be one of the reasons why people support
Roger Goodell’s decisions to suspend players prior to legal
adjudication. The prime example of a league jumping the gun on
a player’s conduct is the story of Green Bay Packers’ former wide
receiver, James Lofton.
279
In 1986, Lofton faced rape charges.
Based solely on the
charges, the NFL suspended Lofton for the last game of the regular
280
281
In the off-season, however, Lofton was acquitted.
The
season.
league acknowledged they made a mistake and backdated Lofton’s
282
salary for the suspended game.
Situations of innocence similar to James Lofton’s remain a
possibility. Indeed, they could be Goodell’s worst nightmare, even
274. Quirk, supra note 72, at 118 (“In retrospect, the iron-handed banishment
of the eight Black Sox players by Judge Landis served organized baseball well. The
exile of the Black Sox restored public confidence in the game.”).
275. See generally Morrissey, supra note 251 (defending Goodell’s enforcement
of the conduct policy).
276. Gibeaut, supra note 126, at 109.
277. THE HURRICANE (Universal Pictures 1999).
278. See Mark Gillespie, Sympathies for Bryant Developing Along Racial Lines:
Similar Patterns with O.J. Simpson Case, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 12, 2003,
available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/9019/Sympathies-Bryant-DevelopingAlong-Racial-Lines.aspx (showing that 35-41% of those polled believed that Kobe
Bryant was at least probably guilty of sexual assault in 2003).
279. See Gibeaut, supra note 126, at 109.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
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though he has made clear that he will suspend players regardless of
283
In this event, the league will most
legal determinations on guilt.
likely pay a player his lost salary, or the player may sue the league
284
for lost wages, bonuses, and possibly lost sponsorship money.
C.

Touchdown – Roger Goodell’s Rulings are the Best for the Business
1.

Economic Impact & Protection of Assets (Players)

Currently the NFL is the most popular sport to watch in the
285
286
world, which also makes it the world’s richest sports league.
The scale of wealth in the NFL ranges from the Dallas Cowboys
(worth $1.5 billion) to the Minnesota Vikings (worth $782
287
The economic success of the league is due largely to
million).
the enormous television contracts it receives by granting major
288
television networks the exclusive right to televise NFL games.
The NFL currently has a $3.7 billion deal with CBS, a $4.3 billion
deal with FOX, a $3.6 billion deal with NBC, and a $1.1 billion deal
289
with ESPN.
Each team receives an equal share of the television
revenues, which the teams use in turn to pay the vast majority of
290
player salaries.
The most valuable asset of a sports league is its players. The
quality of the league fluctuates according to the quality of its
players, similar to stocks. Sports leagues want high-quality players

283. Weisman, supra note 273, at 1C.
284. See Gibeaut, supra note 126, at 109 (“Those are the kinds of things you’ve
got to look at when you’re disciplining players, says general counsel Dennis
Curran, a former prosecutor. You could end up owing a guy an entire year’s
salary.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
285. See Michael K. Ozanian, The Business of Football: How ‘Bout Them Cowboys?,
FORBES.com, Sept. 13, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/business/2007/09/13/dallascowboys-stadium-biz-07nfl_cx_mo_0913nflintro.html (“Although its television
ratings have slipped over the past decade, the NFL still beats the daylights out of
other prime-time programming, including every other sport.”).
286. Id. The average NFL team is worth $957 million. Id.
287. Monte Burke, Lifting a Loser: Michael Bidwill Vows to Transform the Cardinals
from Laughingstock to Contender in the NFL, FORBES, Oct. 1, 2007, at 97.
288. See Ozanian, supra note 285 (discussing how the NFL’s television contracts
fuel the league’s revenue).
289. Id.
290. See Pepper Brill, Major League Soccer or Major League Sham? Players Bring Suit
to Bite the Hand That Feeds Them, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 585, 585 (1999)
(explaining that player salaries capture a growing percentage of revenues earned
through league television contracts).
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competing at optimal levels to create attractive and popular games
for the fans to watch. Without high-quality players, minor sports
leagues would spring up with similarly-skilled players to compete
with the major sports leagues. This would eventually force the
major sports leagues to disintegrate into multiple smaller sports
leagues competing for fan attraction.
The current state of NFL competition, however, demands the
highest quality players. Quality includes not only on-the-field
athletic prowess, including speed and strength, but also high
quality players off the field. The league holds the players to a high
standard off the field because player conduct is representative of
the league, their team, and its surrounding community. This
representation correlates with fan sentiment towards players and
teams, which in turn affects the league’s economic success.
Lowering the quality of players would create a domino effect.
Lower quality players equal lower quality teams competing in less
exciting games to watch. Less fan interest equals less lucrative
television contracts for the league, as well as sponsors.
Numerous sponsors immediately dropped Michael Vick
291
following his felony indictment for dogfighting;
sponsors
similarly dropped Kobe Bryant as a result of simply being charged
292
with sexual assault.
Imagine if the league did not suspend Vick,
and let him play; it is likely that these sponsors would drop the
Atlanta Falcons or possibly the league. Also, consider the amount
of people that were willing to stop attending Falcons’ games solely
293
The totality of these
due to Vick’s involvement in dogfighting.
circumstances would be detrimental to the league’s image, which
would create less economic success and decrease the money
available for players’ salaries.

291. See Richard Sandomir, In Endorsements, No Athlete is a Sure Thing, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 1, 2007, at D5 (noting that Nike, Rawlings, and AirTran Airways
dropped Vick as their pitchman and Upper Deck, and Donruss pulled Vick
memorabilia from their product lines).
292. See id. (noting that Kobe lost nearly all his sponsors before the sexual
assault charge against him was dropped).
293. See Tim Tucker, ‘Tarnished’ Club Tries to Rehab Brand, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Sept. 2, 2007, at F1 (noting that an unusually large number of Atlanta Falcons’
ticket holders were attempting to sell their tickets on the internet following the
news of Vick’s alleged involvement in dogfighting).
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Strictly Enforcing the Conduct Policy is in the NFL’s Best Interest

The NFL has been called America’s new national pastime,
America’s game, or the premier sports league in the United
294
It is in the NFL’s best interests to protect this status
States.
through strictly enforcing its conduct policy. First, the NFL laid the
295
blueprint for economic success in sports in the 21st century.
Now, the NFL is setting the standard for discipline for other
leagues to recognize and follow.
NFL player misconduct was already out of hand by the mid to
296
late 1990s, and when Goodell took office in 2006 he quickly
recognized that the problem could ultimately cripple the sport’s
image. In April 2007, Goodell sent a warning shot to players
during a news conference which laid the groundwork for the
297
conduct policy.
This foresight allowed Goodell to seamlessly
handle the Michael Vick situation. When the news broke regarding
Vick’s involvement in illegal dogfighting, most people already knew
what the commissioner was going to do under the league’s conduct
298
The league was able to take this possible hit to its image
policy.
and respond forcefully because it had a strategy in place to handle
this kind of situation. The NFL will not tolerate this behavior,
because whether players like it or not, children look up to NFL
players as role models.
a.

Role Models

It is impossible to calculate the effect that players have on
society, especially on youth across America. Children often
emulate their favorite players in backyards and playgrounds while
wearing their favorite players’ jerseys, possibly even Michael Vick’s
jersey, which was among the NFL’s top-five selling jerseys since
299
The NFL is sending a clear message to these youth that if
2001.
they want to play in the NFL they cannot get into trouble like

294. See MACCAMBRIDGE, supra note 107, at xiv–xix (describing the NFL’s
passing of MLB as the most popular sport in the United States).
295. Id.
296. See supra Part IV.B.1.
297. See supra Part II.B.3.a.
298. See Gary Myers, Suspension Suspense. Signs Point to NFL Banning Vick for
Entire Season, DAILY NEWS (New York), July 29, 2007, at 73 (noting that most
believed Goodell would suspend Vick).
299. William C. Rhoden, The Elusive Vick Takes His Hardest Hit, N.Y. TIMES, July
20, 2007, at D2.
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Michael Vick, “Pacman” Jones, Chris Henry, or “Tank” Johnson. It
is already bad enough for the NFL that parents have to explain to
those children too young to understand why their favorite player is
not on the field this year. For those old enough to understand, it is
a harsh realization to learn that their favorite player is going to be
behind bars instead of on the playing field.
b.

Winning is not Everything

Winning is like a drug for a lot of coaches: they will do almost
anything for it. Some coaches even desire players who have a
300
Former NFL head coach Dick Vermeil once
history of fighting.
commented about the character of a player his team drafted, “I like
the guys that don’t start it but finish it. I like those kind of guys.
301
The player Coach Vermeil was
This is a physical contact game.”
describing had recently been involved in the brutal beating of a
302
fellow student. The player, along with three teammates, beat the
student so badly it caused him paralysis and permanent brain
303
damage.
Today, NFL coaches must hesitate in their aggressive
player scouting since Roger Goodell stepped in and decided
winning is not everything.
Now, coaches do not just want players to be fighters, they also
304
This
want fighters who have not been in trouble with the law.
305
Extensive
changes the way organizations put teams together.
investigation into a player used to include a player’s strength,
306
speed, quickness, and skills on the field.
Now, teams with the
300. See, e.g., Mathew P. Barry, et. al., Judicial Opinion on The Criminality of Sports
Violence in The United States, 15 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 7 (2005) (stating
that players are encouraged to engage in violent acts on the field both legal and
illegal).
301. BENEDICT & YAEGER, supra note 3, at 4.
302. Id. at 2–3.
303. Id.
304. See Ken Murray, Teams Choose to be Pickier; New Policy Might Steer NFL Clubs
Away from Troublemakers, BALT. SUN, Apr. 28, 2007, at 1C (discussing the Baltimore
Ravens’ strategy of removing players off its draft board due to character issues).
305. See also Joel Michael Ugolini, Even a Violent Game Has its Limits: A Look at
the NFL’s Responsibility for the Behavior of its Players, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 41, 48 (2007)
(“teams have spent millions of dollars scouting, administering physical and
psychological tests and performing background checks on potential draftees, as
the question of a player’s character was never more of an issue than it is today”
(quoting NFL Checks Draftees in Wake of Off Field Incidents: Spent Millions in
Background Checks, Psychological Testing, SportsLawNews.com, Apr. 11, 2000,
http://www.sportslawnews.com/archive/Articles%202000/NFLDraftexams.htm)).
306. Id.
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help of the league, must thoroughly research players in search of
307
past, present, or future character flaws.
In preparation for last year’s NFL draft, the league
administered a questionnaire to prospective players, which
308
The
included a question regarding past use of marijuana.
responses were supposed to be confidential, but unfortunately the
309
media caught wind of some of the players’ responses. As a result
of the mix-up, Goodell spoke with each player in person and
310
apologized.
This fault is not the only wrinkle the commissioner
needs to iron-out.
V. OFF-SEASON CONDITIONING - RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Punishment Disparities
Despite the positive steps Goodell has taken, there is currently
a disparity in the punishments he has handed down in the NFL.
New England Patriots’ head coach Bill Belichek received a
$500,000 fine for videotaping his opponents’ signals during a
311
The
game, but Belichek was not suspended for the violation.
league suspended Dallas Cowboys’ assistant coach Wade Wilson for
five games and fined him $100,000, however, for violating the
312
Wilson’s violation and
league’s substance abuse policy.
Belichek’s are not the same, but one would have to assume that
Wilson would rather pay the fine without the suspension, and all
the players disciplined under the conduct policy would most likely
desire a fine over a suspension. Goodell could eliminate this type
307. See id. (noting that the NFL’s security department conducts background
checks on the incoming draft class and makes the results available to the teams).
308. See Sam Farmer, Character will Count in the NFL Draft: With a Stricter Conduct
Policy, Teams will be Cautious about Making the Right Decisions. Drug Use, Violence are
Issues among Top Prospects, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2007, at D3 (discussing the leak of
information about draft prospects’ drug use).
309. Id.
310. See Megan Manfull, NFL DRAFT; Big Brother will be Watching Okoye; Older
Sibling will be there for Texas’ Teen Pick, HOUSTON CHRON. (Tex.), Apr. 30, 2007, at 1
(noting that Goodell personally met with the players to apologize for the
information leak regarding the players’ past marijuana use).
311. See Ed Werder, Dallas Assistant Wants Goodell to Explain Belichek’s
Punishment, ESPN.com, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3019472
(explaining the punishments received by Belichek and the Patriots for the videotape scandal).
312. See id. (noting that Wilson violated the league’s substance abuse policy by
buying human growth hormone, allegedly for his diabetic condition).
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of disparity by implementing punishment guidelines, similar to
sentencing guidelines used by judicial systems.
B. Punishment Guidelines
Expectations of punishment and overall fairness to players and
coaches would increase if the league’s disciplinary policies included
punishment guidelines. The disciplinary policies already include
the type of conduct punishable, but the length of suspensions and
size of fines need to be more specific. For example, the league
could detail that a player committing a minor offense under the
conduct policy is subject to a one to four game suspension with a
fine of no more than $100,000. For more serious offenses, a player
would receive a suspension of four to eight games and a fine no
larger than $250,000, and so forth. The league could then detail
non-exclusive lists of what constitutes minor and serious offenses.
This would still grant the commissioner discretionary power to
determine punishment, and at the same time players and coaches
would not feel singled out because they would know what type of
313
punishment to expect.
C. Neutral Arbitrator & Standard of Review
The NFL commissioner as prosecutor, judge, and jury is a very
dangerous concept, and negotiating with a commissioner to
relinquish this broad power would be very difficult. But, this broad
power allows Roger Goodell to impose punishments as he sees fit.
A dictatorial commissioner in the future, however, could abuse this
power exponentially. Therefore, allowing players and coaches to
appeal their punishments to a neutral arbitrator would safeguard
the league. But to discipline players effectively, the league should
also provide strict guidelines for arbitrators.
Only if the NFL has punishment guidelines in place should it
consider allowing players and coaches to appeal to a neutral
arbitrator.
The arbitrator would then be able to evaluate
punishments according to the guidelines already in place. Also,
the league should place strict limits on arbitrators by requiring
313. See also Ugolini, supra note 305, at 54 (“A detailed code of conduct with
set penalties would put all players on notice of the consequences for their actions
while avoiding the appearance of arbitrariness and favoritism that can accompany
decisions made on a case by case basis.” (citing Note, Out of Bounds: Professional
Sports Leagues and Domestic Violence, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1048, 1052 (1996)).
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them to use an “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review over a
“just cause” standard of review used by other sports leagues.
Arbitrators in the NBA and BASEBALL use a “just cause”
314
standard of review. A more effective standard for the NFL would
be “arbitrary and capricious.” An “arbitrary and capricious”
standard of review requires an arbitrator to look at whether a
commissioner’s decision was founded on prejudice rather than
315
This standard would place a firm check on a
reasons or facts.
commissioner’s disciplinary authority. Additionally, the league
could require a tripartite arbitration panel and even an appellate
316
arbitration system. These checks and balances would further the
level of fairness to players and coaches.
VI. CONCLUSION
The NFL’s problem with player off-the-field misconduct went
on for much too long. Now, Roger Goodell is taking a stand
against this misconduct and showing society that there is more to
football than putting the best athlete on the playing field. Now,
not only must the players have talent, but also solid moral
character.
The NFL is able to raise the standards of player morality by
strictly enforcing its conduct policy, something which all the other
major sports fail to do. The NFL is the only sport to retain the
traditional model of powers granted to commissioners dating back
to Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis. While all other sports leagues
hesitate to discipline players for conduct, the NFL is not holding
back, regardless of legal adjudications. The NFL believes its stance
on conduct is in the best interests of the sport. Not only is that
stance the best for its business, but also legal and just.
The NFL’s disciplinary system, however, still needs to iron out
a few wrinkles. Implementing punishment guidelines would
eliminate the disparity in punishments, ease the commissioner’s
judgment on severity, and increase player expectations. Moreover,
the NFL could alter its appeal process by allowing players to appeal
314. See supra Parts IV.A.4.a.i, IV.A.4.a.ii.
315. See Matthew McKelvey, Separating Sports and Real Life: How Professional
Sports Leagues’ Collective Bargaining Agreements Keep Athletes Out of the Criminal Justice
System, 27 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 91, 115 (2001) (“[T]he
appropriate standard of review should be whether the discipline imposed was
arbitrary and capricious, not whether there was just cause for the discipline.”).
316. See id. at 123 (explaining the advantages of tripartite arbitration panels).
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to a neutral arbitrator using an “arbitrary and capricious” standard
of review.
In conclusion, the impact on society is too detrimental to allow
NFL players to play by the rules on the field, while they are not
playing by the rules off it. Our society is already one of the most
317
violent in the world, and we do not want to send the wrong
message to America’s youth. A lasting impression left on kids
should not include winning at all costs.
“Success may result in winning, but winning does not
318
necessarily mean you are a success.”

317. See Kathleen Antonia, A Lesson Before Living – America Remains a Violent
Society in which Stereotypes are too often Applied, HUMANIST, March 2001, available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1374/is_2_61/ai_72274472 (noting that
the United States remains one of the most violent and lawless societies in the
world).
318. JOHN WOODEN & STEVE JAMISON, THE ESSENTIAL WOODEN: A LIFETIME OF
LESSONS ON LEADERS AND LEADERSHIP xvi (2007).
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